U.S. Army Transformation: The U.K. View

Colonel William H. Moore, U.K. Army, Royal Artillery

From the United Kingdom's (U.K.'s) perspective, the U.S. Army transformation process is one of the more adventurous and exciting military programs in the world today. Emerging from U.S. Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki's vision, transformation has moved ahead at a breathtaking pace.

The transformation process is an entirely logical program. If successful, it will focus the U.S. Army on key aspects of rapid effect and deployability, making it an appropriate force for the 21st century. The process, which appears to have minimal risk, will improve the legacy force, thus maintaining a strong warfighting capability while developing its interim and objective forces. With adequate funding, transformation will be successful.

The U.K. Ministry of Defence differs from its U.S. counterpart in that it is more closely integrated because it is smaller and must make the most economical use of its scarce assets. For example, the U.K. Army does not have its own budget, and procuring equipment is a truly joint affair. Despite rhetoric from the Association of the U.S. Army, U.S. Army transformation might not have the full support of the other U.S. services. Also, despite U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's ongoing review, how much defense support the U.S. Army has in terms of dollars is still unknown.

To the outside world U.S. Army transformation seems focused on equipment and the revolution in military affairs. Yet, this is not the focus in discussions with anyone from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command or with some U.S. Army senior leaders. The U.S. Army, in fact, is taking a holistic view of what it is currently doing, but this picture is not portrayed outside the United States. Some might not consider such an observation valid, but if allies do not have a real grasp of what is happening, they might find it difficult to work out how to best work together.

A year after the Labour Government came to power, the U.K. faced no clearly identifiable strategic threat. While its first priority was to ensure national defense, the armed forces were to pursue a more expeditionary role. But how were they to be configured for such a mission?

A future battlespace might have many more players than it might have had during the Cold War. The army would operate more closely with maritime and air components to truly project power where it was most needed. More, and different, allies would be involved in coalitions. There would also be more interested parties in theater than hitherto. Contractors; other government departments; nongovernment organizations, such as the Red Cross and other charity-based organizations; the United Nations; bodies like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and multinational cartels would be in theater sooner and remain behind longer. People, possibly neutrals, would continue to depend on the armed forces, support their actions, or be downright hostile to their mere presence.

To conduct a successful campaign, a totally integrated approach by all parties would be required to bring a crisis to a satisfactory conclusion. This is the environment in which the U.K. sees itself operating in the future. Allies are key. The U.K. cannot go it alone; therefore, its developmental priorities have been defined accordingly. First and most important is the ability to conduct alliance and coalition warfighting; second is using those same capabilities to conduct national-only warfighting (a rerun of the Falklands, for example); third is using the same set of capabilities again.

Other U.K. and U.S. allies must operate alongside one another to create such a situation. Equipment interfaces will be important, and how business is conducted should be broadly recognizable, as should our way of thinking—interoperability of the mind is probably the main factor. The United States is running ahead so fast that its allies might not be able to keep pace or even to catch up. This might be the allies' problem. Why should the United States wait for us? The bottom line is that we will need to fight together, and this might require some accommodation now. Thus, it is of the utmost importance for the U.K. to understand what the United States is doing. To conduct effective operations, both nations must remain engaged in dialogue. The U.K. must understand U.S. concepts of operations and capabilities before it gets to the line of departure if it is to help in an integrated effort.

Any country's developmental process must be cognizant of the trends and challenges that are likely to face its armed forces. While trying to predict the future is fraught with danger—as many have discovered to their cost—there are, nonetheless, certain enduring trends and challenges that all face. One challenge is to get into the theater more quickly and with more effect to deter, coerce, and ultimately defeat an enemy. The U.K., therefore, is extremely supportive of the concept behind the U.S. transformation process. Indeed, the U.K. has defined a similar idea and termed it rapid and early effect, the rapid part being the military contribution to early effect where the emphasis is not on the speed of deployment but, rather, the operational and tactical impact once deployed.

The U.K. Army is currently only capable of conducting rapid effect in low-risk or small other operations. In fact, it is rather good at doing so, as for example, the 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment's highly successful operation that effected the rescue of hostages from the West Side Boys in Sierra Leone. But, the U.K. needs to do better; it needs to develop its

forces to conduct rapid effect in more intense other operations. The U.K., however, does not believe it will be able to develop a rapid effect force capable of warfighting against a matched enemy until about 2025 or that the step change in technology will occur in the timeframe the U.S. Army is planning for the objective force. If it does, it would allow the more rapid transformation of some U.K. forces, but the revolution has yet to occur.

The U.K. is attempting to improve the capability of its light forces, developing its medium forces, and rebalancing its heavier forces. Medium forces will be configured, under present tentative plans, to fit the C-130 envelope, and the U.K. Army is currently deciding the effect that this concept might have on its equipment program.

The Future Rapid Effect System is in an early stage—embryonic when compared to what the United States is doing with its interim brigade combat teams (IBCTs). Nonetheless, because the U.K. does not believe in a short-term technology fix, its approach is more incremental.

The U.K. is trying to identify the technologies it wishes to insert downstream then introduce them incrementally as the various constituents become proven. Such a modular approach reduces technical risk and allows a more level funding profile. This latter point is most important because of the joint nature of the U.K. Army's procurement process. An expensive project with high-tech risk is vulnerable when defense budgets are squeezed. The process, therefore, is one of evolution, not revolution—incremental, rather than big bang.

U.K. medium forces are unlikely to be hard-wired, so their peacetime structure is different from U.S. IBCTs. The U.K. envisions force packaging from its heavy, medium, and light forces to achieve the necessary effect. In a simple warfighting scenario, light forces would effect entry; medium forces might stabilize the situation; heavy forces would produce decisive action. U.K. medium forces must have utility around the spectrum of conflict. The army is too small to develop niche capabilities. Until this step-change in technology occurs, medium forces will have to be used in the following ways:

- To support heavy forces in warfighting, such as in rear area and flank operations and on complex terrain.
- For more intense other operations, short of warfighting.
- For rapid effect in operations short of warfighting.

The U.K. Army has yet to decide on how these functions might evolve in structural terms, but one solution might be to develop medium forces from current mechanized and light forces to provide an intervention and utility force. This recognizes that full-spectrum ground maneuver using medium forces can only take place in about 2025. Then, medium forces, when developed, must have the widest possible usefulness in the future operating environment. In this concept, the U.K. Army is completely onboard with the U.S. Army; the ends are the same, only the ways and means differ.

Overly relying on technology to produce solutions for warfare is a great concern. In the end, resolving a conflict invariably centers on issues of people and territory, tasks that demand land force deployment.

Killing at a distance using high-tech sensors linked to long-range weapon systems from all services against a matched enemy in a warfighting operation is an entirely logical solution. But even sophisticated enemies will not wish to subject themselves to such high-tech destruction and defeat, and technology might not have the desired effect on less-sophisticated adversaries. We should be wary of analysts who say we can always win at a distance. History does not bear this out. ***MR***

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Cashiering Freedom for Security: Lessons in Modern Terrorism

J. Michael Brower

Reflecting on the indispensability of the terrorist technique in 1920, Leon Trotsky, the first Soviet Commissar for War, wrote about the issue while on a military train during Russia's bloody civil war (1918-1922). Trotsky's pamphlet, *Terrorism and Communism*, still speaks to those on either side of the ramparts of a "new" kind of war—one with a long, tortured past.[1] "War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war, generally speaking, destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The Red Terror . . . kills individuals and intimidates thousands."[2] The United States is now engaged in just such a war of intimidation—as victim and as avenging angel for the terrorist events of 11 September 2001.

Trotsky knew how to deal with terrorism—take terror to the terrorists. As the price of security, albeit with trepidation and reluctance, U.S. citizens must cashier some freedoms, much treasure, and many lives. Since terrorists have declared a perpetual war on America, America must place itself on a permanent war footing against them.

As a result of the 11 September terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, America is an awakened giant. But even Gulliver was helpless until the Lilliputians released him. Today's Lilliputian terrorists are quite possibly creating the rules of engagement, setting timetables, and doubtless anticipating unifying action from a wounded nation. Attacking foreign and religiously similar civilian

populations and their infrastructures only serves the terrorists' agenda.

Civilians, both rich and poor, are hostages to terrorists committing their macabre, cowardly crimes before an appalled global audience. Terrorist groups are also the wellspring of radicalism. Unbridled killing only augments the cadre of martyrs and martyrs-in-waiting. In preventing the coalescing of Islamic forces, who are themselves divided unless united by indiscriminate attack, we may yet act with fury—but not with blind fury.

Sadly, the most savage countermeasures are required for the short term, given that terrorists have access to the means, if not immediately the weapons, of mass destruction. To deter future terrorist aggression and to cut off the head of the focus of terrorist evil in the modern world, we must deliver justice to Osama bin Laden.

To bin Laden's sponsors and followers—those who view Western life as an abomination—thousands of killed and wounded are but a dress rehearsal. Chemical, biological, and possibly tactical nuclear weapons use could be the next logical step. Similarly, even as a coalition unites to face the menace of terrorism, indefensible prey to terrorist cells abounds: water supplies; fragile infrastructure; landmarks; refineries; communications; and ultimately, large, urban population centers. For the terrorist, all means to harm the public are within the Pale.

Thousands of people were killed in the September attacks, but tens and hundreds of thousands of lives are forfeit absent bold (but measured) visionary (but timely) action. Anticipating the retaliation to inevitable military action, the West must be prepared to institutionalize a passport society, suffer racial profiling, possibly federalize security for airlines or regulate them entirely, expand search and seizure, and permit extremes when interrogating suspected terrorists. Later, it may be necessary to militarize labor and the borders and civil society in general and practice armed retaliation with extreme prejudice against suspected terrorists and their safe havens. Americans are understandably loath to suspend their social liberties, but after the next terrorist attack, itself an inevitability, they may be more amenable.

Reliance on small, elite units to penetrate terrorist cells and establishing nuclear, chemical, and biological hit squads is now the dictated, if detestable, order of the day. Similarly, assassinating active, notorious terrorists and their sponsors; seizing assets from the same; exacting zero tolerance for trafficking in the craft of terror; and changing America's governmental and social culture to put security before business are the fate of a properly wary populace. Wholesale adoption—even expansion of—counterterrorist methodologies that terror-seasoned states like Israel embrace is almost a foregone conclusion.

In August 1940, Trotsky wrote: "History teaches us that when adventurist organizations lack sufficient political forces to solve a task, the idea of terrorist acts arises by itself. This is the classic formula of individual terrorism."[3] Terrorism is the last act of the desperate organization, an appeal to chaos. If we ignore historical instruction that those who have mastered this foul art form provide, we will become the gravedigger of U.S. freedom and national survival.

Trotsky taught that terrorism is a calculated, though misguided and misanthropic, approach to addressing the helplessness of the masses. Defending against it is a permanent societal posture. The only historically effective short-term solution to terrorism is to deal with its symptoms terroristically. For the long term, state-sponsored, institutionalized terrorism must witness its breeding grounds defoliated by a process of expanding social and economic justice. When common people, in whose behalf the terrorist acts, renounce violence and dare to hope for a better future, terrorism withers away. In navigating a complex, interdependent, yet economically polarized world full of apocalyptic weapons, these are the only roads. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Trotsky, Leon, *Terrorism and Communism* (Publisher unknown, 1920).
2. Trotsky, Publishing information not given.
3. Ibid.

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MR Letters

MR Misses the Mark?

Thanks for the copies of *Military Review*, but I'm disappointed in the editing of my book review (*RIPCORD: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000). RIPCORD was not fought at (or anywhere near) Dienbeinphu, but—in the words of my original text—"corresponded" in historical terms with that 1954 French-Vietminh battle. Second, helicopters were not (your wording) "available" to companies and platoons, which were (my wording) "helicopter-less." Now, I appreciate that editors have the prerogative of abridgement (though my review was shorter than several in the issue), but I don't think you should have taken the liberty of changing my meaning, especially when the result is so historically, geographically, and tactically absurd.

COL William L. Hauser, *USA, Retired, Manhasset, New York*

Editor's note: MR regrets any confusion. Clearly we did not understand Hauser's wording.

Then, Again. . . .

I [just received] the latest *Military Review* in which two of my reviews appear. I am honored. After I finished reading my own contributions, I checked my own texts, and the changes you made were minor, but they improved the pieces. Is an author really writing this to an editor?

Lewis Bernstein, *Senior Historian, SMDC, Huntsville, Alabama*

The New Interim Brigade Combat Team: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Major Gregory A. Pickell, U.S. Army National Guard

We do not know yet the exact shape of our future military, but we know the direction we must begin to travel. On land, our heavy forces will be lighter. Our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to deploy and to sustain.

—President George W. Bush[1]

Glowing pronouncements from President George W. Bush aside, the concepts underlying the U.S. Army's new interim brigade combat team (IBCT) are hardly revolutionary. While forming the cornerstone of the Army's transformation campaign, the interim brigades are, to a surprising extent, resurrections of the experimental 9th Motorized Division and the Army of Excellence (AOE) Light Infantry Divisions of the 1980s. Little has changed since then. The same conceptual flaws that plagued the earlier attempts to break with orthodoxy are being replicated with eerie consistency today. Not only are the basic concepts behind the Army's current interim-brigade design not new, they are ideas that have failed twice.

The 9th Motorized Division

In 1980, U.S. Army Chief of Staff (CSA) General Edward (Shy) Meyer initiated the 9th Motorized Division concept, which was radical for its time. Using a variety of emerging technologies, Army leaders hoped to create an entirely new type of division. According to one account, the new formation would be used as a test bed to "develop, evaluate, and implement initiatives relating to operations, organization, doctrine, and technology."[2] Leaders envisioned enhancements in the areas of "command and control, firepower, tactical mobility, survivability, and flexibility."[3]

At the time, the initiative was regarded as a truly audacious idea that could eventually transform Army force structure. In the end, the 9th Motorized Division experiment was regarded as a failure. The innovative concept envisioned the application of a series of technologies that did not then exist, forcing the interim organization to substitute off-the-shelf equipment that became permanent when new technologies failed to materialize.[4]

Surprising no one, the interim division's enhanced mobility was offset by inadequate direct and indirect firepower, placing the organization at a severe disadvantage when facing mechanized or armored opponents. In the end, the inability to field the new technologies, coupled with significant institutional skepticism concerning what was essentially the brainchild of one man (Meyer), doomed the first attempt to field a revolutionary kind of Army division.

The Light Division

The AOE light division was also seen as a bold step forward. According to its proponents, it was designed to deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours. In fact, strategic mobility was its overriding feature. Following its certification as a part of the Army force structure, the light division was theoretically capable of being deployed to a combat theater with 550 C-141 sorties.

Unlike its ill-fated motorized cousin, the AOE light division actually became part of the conventional force structure, in part because of the political savvy of CSA General John A. Wickham. Several of the divisions were eventually fielded, although none were ever deployed as a complete organization.[5]

While the light division's deployability was its chief calling card, deployability was virtually its only attractive feature. The light division's complement of equipment, driven almost exclusively by the need to limit airlift roundtrips, placed too much emphasis on combat assets and neglected the division's vital combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities. Ironically, despite its emphasis on combat assets, the organization was still unable to meet opposing mechanized and armored formations on anything approximating equal terms. Worst of all, because of its overwhelming fixation on strategic mobility, as measured by C-141 flights, the light division possessed little or no operational or tactical mobility once deployed.[6]

Enter the Interim Brigade

Interim brigade combat teams draw directly on many salient features of their recent antecedents. With a stated goal identical to that driving the formation of AOE light divisions, interim brigades are slated to be deployable in just 96 hours.[7] Like the 9th Division, interim brigades will possess unparalleled tactical mobility once deployed. Also in common with the 9th Division is the interim brigade's extensive dependence on off-the-shelf equipment pending the arrival of yet-to-be-developed technologies and weapon systems.[8]

Taking its cue from the organizational opposition suffered by Meyer in his advocacy of the motorized division concept, current Army leaders have closely followed the Wickham model. By ensuring that critical proponent agencies, such as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and the U.S. Army Forces Command are on board, CSA General Eric K. Shinseki has largely guaranteed that this particular Army transformation campaign initiative will live beyond his tenure.

While, unlike its two predecessors, the new interim brigade might represent a programmatic success story, this is hardly enough to ensure its future survival. Until the Army successfully overcomes the operational, doctrinal, and technological hurdles that plagued the motorized division and the AOE light infantry divisions, the interim brigade's future

cannot be viewed with optimism.

Like the AOE light divisions, the overriding hallmark of the interim brigade is its strategic mobility. Unfortunately, virtually all of the enhancements related to the brigade's command and control (C2), lethality, survivability, and flexibility will have to wait for the fielding of yet-to-be-developed technologies and weapons platforms. In the meantime, the only meaningful design requirements being developed and tested are those relating to transportability. The interim brigade platform must be C-130 transportable; everything else is negotiable.[9]

If emphasis on strategic agility is laudable, it is also explicitly dangerous to the soldiers involved. While the interim brigade will likely be deployable in 550 sorties, this agility is likely to be achieved at the cost of the CS and CSS assets needed to make the organization viable in a theater of war. As with the 9th Motorized Division, the interim brigade will lack the ability to stand up to a mechanized or armored opponent in a direct firefight. The new initiative solves only one problem—tactical and operational mobility—while sidestepping the much tougher problems that surround sustainability, survivability, and lethality.

If the interim brigade's inability to survive on the 21st century direct-fire battlefield places formations at risk, the lack of effective fire support presents an even greater challenge. As currently designed, the interim brigade will lack even the woefully inadequate 105-millimeter artillery battalion that represented the light divisions' heaviest close battle fire support. Why? Because self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin and the much-anticipated Crusader, are deemed too heavy to play a role with the new formations. The result will be an organization at a disadvantage in the direct firefight and wholly at the mercy of the enemy in the indirect-fire arena. Unfortunately, adding the high-mobility artillery rocket system and mortars as deep and close-in firepower assets will not significantly redress this shortcoming.

Three fundamental truths plague the Army's new interim brigade concept:

1. The new interim brigade would lack the same CS and CSS assets that the AOE light divisions lacked which undercut their effectiveness in the 1980s.

2. The advanced technologies necessary to allow the new interim brigade to hold its own on the modern battlefield do not exist.

3. Fire support will not improve in the future unless a completely revolutionary fire support system is developed.

These three red flags should prompt a time-out, not a Pentagon call for full speed ahead. In effect, the only IBCT breakthrough is the development of operational and tactical mobility once a unit is deployed, although even this capability comes at an exchange ratio of 3 to 1 in terms of deployable combat assets as compared to AOE light infantry divisions.[10]

Ultimately, the interim-brigade concept's success hinges overwhelmingly on the accelerated development of new technologies. The concepts' proponents hope it will achieve what has historically been unattainable—lightweight, highly deployable units that can go toe to toe with an armored or mechanized opponent while providing indirect-fire support and requiring minimal logistic and C2 support.[11]

History should not tie the Army down or hold back the prudent application of new technologies; but neither should the Army ignore lessons learned. If history is any judge, the chances of a revolutionary system arriving in time to save the interim brigade concept are not encouraging. ***MR***

NOTES

1. George W. Bush, speech at Norfolk Naval Air Station, Virginia, 13 February 2001. Online at <www.humaneventsonline.com/articles/02-19-01/dagosting.html>.
2. Lewis Bernstein, "Army Experimental Formations and Their Possible Influence on the Establishment of the Force XXI Experimental Force" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, undated). Online at <http://call.army.mil/ products/exfor/history/xforhst.htm>.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Rodler F. Morris, Scott W. Lackey, George J. Mordica II, and J. Patrick Hughes, *Initial Impressions Report: Changing the Army* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1996), chapter 3.
6. John Gordon and Peter Wilson, *The Case for Army XXI Medium Weight Aero-Motorized Divisions: A Pathway to the Army of2020* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1998), 11. Online at <http://call.army.mil/products/exfor/specrpt/sprptoc.htm>.
7. Mike Cast, "Interim Armored Vehicle Testing Begins," *Army News Service* (8 June 2000).
8. Ibid.
9. "IBCTs are the First Step in Creating Objective Force," *Army News Service* (15 May 2000).
10. The AOE Light Divisions deployed light infantry brigades using the 550-sortie limit. The IBCTs will likely use a similar number of sorties to surge a single IBCT.
11. Jim Caldwell, "Technology Breakthroughs Keep Transformation on Track," *Army News Service* (11 January 2001).

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Operation Anaconda, Shah-i-Khot Valley, Afghanistan, 2-10 March 2002[1]

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They just kept sending them into our meat grinder. We've killed several hundred of them, but they just keep coming.

—Major General F.L. Hagenbeck[2]

As of 2 March 2002, Operation Anaconda was the largest combat operation in Afghanistan of the War on Terrorism that began after the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Major General F.L. Hagenbeck, commander of the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division, led the major effort to clean out remaining al-Qaeda fighters and their Taliban allies in the Shah-i-Khot Valley. The mission involved about 2,000 coalition troops, including more than 900 Americans, 200 U.S. Special Forces and other troops, and 200 special operations troops from Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, France, Norway, New Zealand, and Afghan allies.

Operation Anaconda began before dawn on 2 March 2002. The battle area occupied about 60 square miles. The terrain is rugged, and the peaks have many spurs and ridges. The base of the Shah-i-Khot Valley is approximately 8,500 feet in altitude.

The surrounding mountain peaks rise to 11,000 to 12,000 feet. Only small juniper trees grow on the mountain slopes. The actual snow line began about 100 feet above the valley floor. Mountain villages include the hamlets of Sher Khan Khel, Babal Khel, Marzak, Kay Khel, and Noor Khel. On the day battle began, the valley floor was sprinkled with small patches of snow. Temperatures hovered near 15 to 20 degrees Fahrenheit.[3]

The opposition forces were mostly non-Afghan al-Qaeda and Taliban members although the force also included some Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks, and Pakistanis. Scattered groups, numbering as many as 20 members, including some family members, holed up in a 3,000-year-old complex of mountain tunnels, caves, and crannies.

The terrorists, who had come to the valley villages six weeks before the battle began, took control; prudently, most of the civilians left. One Afghan villager said the people were told, "If you want to leave or stay it is up to you, but we're staying in those caves because they were ours in the holy war against Russia."[4] The terrorists gave 700 sheep to the people of Shah-i-Khot for their troubles; others received bus fare.

Predator drones and other CIA intelligence assets spotted the enemy assembling in groups south of Gardez, but rather than immediately attacking, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) let the terrorists gather to present a larger target. A small U.S. Special Forces detachment accompanied local Afghan commander Zia Lodin as his men entered the valley from the south and headed to Sirkankel to flush out suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban forces.[5]

To the east and southeast of the combat area, Afghan generals Kamal Khan Zadran and Zakim Khan's units had responsibility for the perimeter. U.S. Special Forces teams were with each Afghan general to help coordinate operations. This noose of allied troops enclosed four specific combat zones. The two most significant zones were code-named Objectives Remington and Ginger. Reconnaissance forces slipped into the mountains a few days before the main attack was scheduled to begin on 27 February, but the operation was postponed 48 hours because of rainy, blustery weather.

When the operation began, Zia ran into trouble. His 450-man unit was caught in a mortar barrage and prevented from entering Sirkankel. Two of Zia's men were killed and 24 were wounded. Retreating under mortar and rocket fire, the Afghan column stumbled into a second ambush to the rear. U.S. Special Forces Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman was killed. Most of Zia's trucks were destroyed, and his troops retreated to Gardez.[6]

The hole left by Zia's retreat had to be plugged. U.S. troops, who had been slated to block fleeing terrorists or hopscotch around the battle zone, were immediately dropped into the gap to await Zia's return. Elements of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain and 101st Airborne Divisions were to set up blocking positions to support Afghan allies as they swept through the villages and dislodged al-Qaeda forces. Both units ran into heavy resistance.

Allied special operations troops were tasked to block known routes of escape from the south and southwest, conduct reconnaissance, and call in air strikes. Brigadier General Duncan Lewis, commander of the Australian Army's special operations forces, told the press that about 100 Special Air Service (SAS) commandos had been inserted into remote observation points atop mountains near the towns of Marzak and Sher Khan Khel. The commandos were to pinpoint rebels retreating from the large target area known as Remington.[7]

The 10th Mountain Division, 2 March

1/87th Infantry Regiment Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Frank Grippe said that the regiment's initial mission was to conduct blocking positions in the southern portion of the valley south of Marzak. Scout sniper teams directly east of Marzak were watching two small canyons that ran out of the village. Just to the north of Marzak, a platoon-size element guarded a larger canyon that ran east out of the valley. In the south, intelligence units estimated that their two positions would possibly have to contain the most terrorist exfiltrators. They also had two blocking positions, one in a canyon running from the southeast of the valley and one running directly south.[8]

At 0600, 2 March 2002, 125 men from the 1/87th Infantry Regiment and three CH-47 helicopters arrived. One CH-47 went to the northern blocking position, which had a platoon-size element and two scout snipers set up as hunter/killer teams. In the south, 82 men on the other two CH-47s arrived at two landing zones separated by about 400 meters. To the south, troops landed at the base of an al-Qaeda stronghold and literally within a minute of being dro-pped off began taking sporadic fire as they moved to cover. A small ridgeline separated the landing zone from the source of fire. Some soldiers maneuvered to a small depression behind the ridge while others moved onto some small ridges to their south.

After the first 10 minutes, al-Qaeda fighters left their caves and well-fortified positions to dump a heavy volume of fire onto the 10th Mountain Division. The al-Qaeda were familiar with the area and had all the low ground in the valley already zeroed in with their mortars, so it did not take long for them to bracket the 10th's mortar and cause the first injuries. After U.S. troops called in close air support, things quieted down. Once troops took cover, organizing and returning fire, they hunkered down for the 18-hour battle of attrition.

Grippe noted that more Afghan forces never arrived.[9] Some of Grippe's soldiers took out targets at ranges up to 500 meters with 5.56-millimeter M4 carbines and M249 small arms weapons. Second Lieutenant Christopher Blaha, who inscribed the names of two of his friends lost on 11 September on all his hand grenades, radioed in an air strike while his 1/87th rifle platoon returned fire on the enemy mortar position about 2,500 meters away. Within five minutes, a B-52 dumped its load and scored a direct hit on the mortar position, ending all movement.[10]

First Lieutenant Charles Thompson and his 10th Mountain troops secured a small al-Qaeda compound before a platoon-size force "hit them by surprise" south of the compound, the direction from which Zia's troops were supposed to have been moving. Thompson's unit repelled the assault with mortar fire and air strikes and apparently inflicted heavy casualties.

Later, the much-reduced al-Qaeda force came up the valley in twos or threes, firing some sniping shots but never mounting a serious threat to troops positioned on ridges on the eastern and western sides of the valley.

A mortar ambush injured at least 12 U.S. soldiers when they landed on top of an al-Qaeda command bunker near Marzak. Because they were wearing body armor, the shrapnel struck mostly their arms and legs. Private First Class Jason Ashline was struck by two bullets in the chest but survived because the rounds lodged in his vest. Ashline later told the press, "For a couple of seconds, everything was . . . in slow-motion. I was pretty scared because I didn't feel no pain. I thought, 'what's wrong?' I thought maybe I was dead."[11] Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Ron Corkran later said, "I didn't really expect them to try and duke it out with us. I was just surprised at the intensity of what I saw on the valley floor."[12] Sergeant First Class (SFC) Thomas Abbott, whose right arm was injured by shrapnel, added, "I've never been so scared in my life. We thought we were all going to die."[13] The wounded were evacuated at around 2000. Near midnight, all elements were extracted from the battle.

The 101 Airborne Division, 2 March

Elsewhere in the valley, 101st Airborne Division brigade commander Colonel Frank Wiercinski landed on a ridge to the south of Sirkankel with an 11-man detachment whose mission was to monitor Charlie Company's progress. As they were moving the command post to higher ground, they began taking fire. Charlie Company was also under fire from an al-Qaeda military compound about 200 meters from where they had landed. Wiercinski described the fight: "We survived three mortar barrages during the day, and at one point we had between 9 to 10 al-Qaeda coming to do [kill] us. But instead, we did [killed] them."[14] Five Charlie Company soldiers stayed on the ridge and, while receiving sniper and machine-gun fire, covered those moving away from the mortar impacts.

Platoon leader Lieutenant Shane Owens' unit was forced into a hasty defense position from its original task of blocking the northern end of the valley. Support Platoon Leader Captain David Mayo of the 1/182d Infantry Regiment and his group provided security for the command and control element and conducted reconnaissance of potential resupply landing zones for the operation. As it turned out, the paratroopers' basic load was enough for 24 hours, and resupply was unnecessary.

Captain Kevin Butler watched in frustration as the enemy ducked into caves seconds before supporting jets dropped their bombs. Moments later, the enemy popped back out to wave, throw rocks, then fire their mortars and heavy machine guns at U.S. troops. Some rounds came within 30 meters of Butler's troops. Frustrated and angry, Butler ran 45 meters uphill six times onto the peak and exposed himself to enemy fire to pinpoint the enemy's position so he could call in an air strike. As the F-15s neared the caves, Butler ordered his own men to fire their 60-millimeter mortars. When the enemy reemerged to taunt the U.S. soldiers, the mortar rounds detonated over their heads and sprayed them with shrapnel. Four were killed.[15]

When allied troops searched the snow-covered mountains for caves and other signs of al-Qaeda fighters, they found several 57-millimeter recoilless rifles, an 82-millimeter mortar, some documents, and night-vision goggles identical to U.S. models.

Units of the 101st Airborne Division moved into the mountains north and east of Sirkankel to block mujahideen escape routes and, with Australian and U.S. Special Forces, blocked routes to the south. A new assault south along the high ground east of the valley began on 3 March.

The Special Operations Battle, 3-4 March

During a 24-hour-long battle on 3-4 March 2002, a handful of U.S. soldiers killed "hundreds" of al-Qaeda fighters while repelling waves of heavily armed mujahideen trying to overrun an isolated hilltop position in the Arma Mountains of southeastern Afghanistan.

The hilltop battle developed during a nighttime attempt to establish a new observation post overlooking a major al-Qaeda supply and escape route. Initial wire service reports were vague and confusing since few reporters accompanied the troops into combat. Later, Commander in Chief, CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks explained that many landing zones had been picked for helicopter assaults, and some enemy forces had evaded detection.[16]

At 0830, an MH-47 Chinook attempting to land a team on a hilltop near Marzak was hit by one or more rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and small arms fire. One grenade bounced off the helicopter and did not explode, but apparently the small arms fire damaged the helicopter's hydraulic system.[17] The Chinook managed to fly a short distance before making a forced landing. A head count showed that all but one of the team had managed to escape aboard the heavily damaged helicopter. The lone man not accounted for was U.S. Navy Petty Officer First Class Neil C. Roberts, a door gunner.[18]

According to Hagenbeck, a second Chinook, flying in tandem with the first and containing a quick reaction force of about 30 special operations troops, flew to the rescue of the downed aircraft.[19] The rescuers, who landed under fire later on the night of the 3 March at the hilltop where Roberts was last seen, came under intense fire. A 21-man Special Forces team was dropped off.

At 1200, a third Chinook was hit while inserting more special operations forces near the site of the first incident. According to Joint Staff briefer U.S. Air Force Brigadier General John Rosa, the helicopter was hit by machine-gun and RPG fire and either crash-landed or experienced a hard landing.[20] Six soldiers were killed and five wounded in subsequent firefights, since the valley suddenly swarmed with enemy troops. Senior Airman Jason Cunningham darted out of the helicopter several times to pull others to safety and was hit by machine-gun fire while treating the wounded.[21]

Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders must have smelled blood, because the shift in U.S. tactics drew masses of them out of hiding and into combat. From the original estimate of only about 150 to 200 men in the area on 2 March, about 500 fresh fighters were detected moving from southern Afghanistan's Khost area as well as from Waziristan, a Pakistani

tribal area where smugglers traditionally found refuge and where many fighters fled after the Taliban government collapsed in November 2001.[22] Some estimates of terrorist strength ran as high as 2,000, but in truth, no one knew how many were in the valley.

Two Australian SAS teams, calling air strikes against the ring of attackers, saved the rescue group that was under intense fire from mortars, machine guns, and small arms. Spectre AC-130 gunships dumped 105-millimeter fire into mujahideen positions while Apaches shot up enemy vehicles moving toward the fight along the narrow mountain roads twisting up steep valleys. Hagenbeck told the press that the "hilltop was surrounded, but we were pounding them all night long. We thought when morning came they were going to do a ground assault. They were poised to overrun the [U.S.] position. We gave everything we had to get those guys out."[23] A heavily armed infantry force was standing by to fight its way up the hilltop to open an escape route if necessary.[24]

Shortly after dark, but before the moon rose on 4 March, more helicopters raced in under covering fire from dozens of strike fighters and attack helicopters to extract the Special Forces and their dead comrades. Next to be withdrawn was the 10th Mountain force. As the helicopters returned safely to Bagram Air Base, the sprawling hub of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, throngs of soldiers anxiously awaited their return.[25]

In addition to 7 U.S. dead, there were at least 40 wounded soldiers, of which 18 were treated and returned to duty.[26] Another 9 Special Forces soldiers and 13 others arrived on 6 and 7 March at Germany's Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, all in good condition.[27] As the smoke figuratively cleared, Franks estimated that U.S. and Afghan forces had killed from 100 to 200 al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters during the hilltop battle.[28]

Continued Operations, 5-10 March

Although the intensity of fighting slacked off on 5 March, allied Afghan commanders sent fresh platoons to the fight while troops in contact kept pressing forward with minesweepers clearing their way. Franks described the fighting as a series of short, often intense clashes with small numbers of fugitives, saying, "We might find five enemy soldiers in one place and then perhaps some distance away from there we may find three and then some distance we may find 15 or 20."[29] One Special Forces soldier said the Taliban he encountered used "spider holes"—well-camouflaged shallow caves stocked with machine guns—that provided protection from the 500-pound bombs where "a couple of guys can hold up a whole company."[30]

At a Pentagon briefing that same day, Hagenbeck said, "We caught several hundred [al-Qaeda] with RPGs and mortars heading toward the fight. We body slammed them today and killed hundreds of those guys."[31]

Zia's forces finally resumed their advance on 6 March. U.S. commanders reported that U.S.-led bombing attacks and ground assaults might have killed as many as 400 fighters of a total of perhaps 800.[32] Sergeant Corey Daniel, who commanded an eight-man forward observation unit, told the press on 9 March that al-Qaeda resistance waned over the next few days as they ran out of ammunition and wilted under nonstop bombing.[33]

Coalition planes continued to hammer the terrorists. Between 2 and 5 March, coalition air forces, using a mix of long-range bombers and tactical aircraft, dropped more than 450 bombs, 350 of which were precision munitions.[34] Rosa told reporters that the U.S. offensive was making progress: "I would say we are softening up in certain portions, but there's still a lot of work to be done. We're far from over."[35]

Afghan commander Abdul Muteen said that U.S. and Afghan forces had advanced to within less than 100 meters of the enemy, who were trying to hold off the allies with copious machine gun and RPG fire. According to Muteen, the enemy was "ready for martyrdom and will die to the last man."[36]

At high altitudes, troop rotation was an important factor in maintaining operational tempo. Another 300 U.S. troops were brought into the battle from a U.S. helicopter base at Kandahar. The helicopters returned one or two hours later to refuel and head out again with fresh troops and supplies.[37]

More Afghans to the Front, 7 March

On 7 March, wind and sandstorms slowed allied air and ground operations, but near dusk a caravan of 12 to 15 Afghan tanks and armored personnel carriers rumbled down the main road south of Kabul toward Paktia Province and the high-elevation combat. The 1,000 Afghan reinforcements, under Northern Commander Gul Haider, were largely Tajik troops who had fought under their late commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, against the Taliban.[38]

To western journalists the T-55 tanks and BMP-1 personnel carriers of General Muhammad Nasim's command looked like a moving museum. Eventually, mechanical attrition took its toll on the aging armored vehicles as they made the 60-mile drive from Kabul.

As the armor column reached the battle zone on 9 March, driving winds and snow forced al-Qaeda holdouts to retreat into their caves. The Tajiks were tasked with helping drive hidden Taliban snipers and fighters from the valley villages of Sher Khan Khel, Babal Khel, and Marzak.[39]

Because the initial grouping of 1,000 Afghan government troops committed to Operation Anaconda were ethnic Pashtuns, cooperation between them and the Tajiks could have been problematic. Apparently, by 10 March, complaints from local commanders prevented Afghan tanks from going any farther than Gardez.

Local ethnic Pashtun commanders warned they would fight national army forces if the Afghan defense ministry, controlled by ethnic Tajik General Mohammed Fahim, did not withdraw troops joining the offensive. Bacha Khan and the other Pashtun commanders insisted that they had enough firepower to defeat the al-Qaeda holdouts without the central government's help or interference.[40]

An unidentified Special Forces officer noted that the majority of the new forces were Pushtun and that their commanders had dropped old rivalries for the larger goal of eliminating the last of the al-Qaeda and Taliban pockets.[41] On 10 March, the officer estimated that between 100 to 200 al-Qaeda forces remained in the valley and that U.S. forces were not approaching the most dangerous part of the war but were in it.

Meanwhile, on 7 March and early on 8 March, U.S. troops came under fire in the southern sector. The clash seemed like a last, defiant gesture. With local terrorist forces severely hurt, U.S. forces repositioned. About 400 U.S. troops returned to Bagram Air Base on 9 March; however, within hours of the withdrawal of one-third of the 1,200 U.S. troops involved in the 8-day-old operation, B-52 bombers had to return to the area.[42]

(Mis)Perceptions of Afghan Allied Support

Some Afghan commanders in Gardez and Kabul asserted that the United States may have made the mistake of relying on a select few local commanders who gave wrong estimates of enemy troop numbers, then backed out on pledges to assist in the battle. Commander Abdul Mateen Hassankheil, who had 1,500 men fighting in Shah-i-Khot, was one of the critics: "The U.S. does not understand our local politics; it does not know whom to trust, and [it] trusts the wrong people."[43]

According to *Financial Times* journalist Charles Clover, in a report from Gardez, Hassankheil claimed that the beginning of the battle was badly planned because the United States relied on intelligence from Padshah Khan, who had told them that the mujahideen at Shah-i-Khot were less numerous than was actually the case.[44] Khan, a powerful local commander ousted as province governor weeks before the battle after clashes with militias in Gardez, allegedly had previously provided misleading information to U.S. military leaders. Khan denied that he had misled the United States and insisted that everyone in Gardez making accusations against him were al-Qaeda. Others in Gardez believed that Khan implicated his enemies as members of al-Qaeda so the United States would remove them.[45]

One unnamed U.S. officer, supposedly familiar with Zia's combat history, said that after Zia's men took heavy fire, Zia probably held them out of the fight with the self-assured knowledge that U.S. forces would have to take up the slack. "This is the way everybody fights over there. Fight and fall back. You don't want to take too many combat losses yourself. You save your resources from attrition to make sure you stay in power when it's all over."[46] Hagenbeck and Wiercinski said they did not know Zia's experience or background, but commanders who had worked with Zia before had spoken highly of him.[47]

Other U.S. officers theorized that someone leaked the plan of attack to the enemy. U.S. troops had trained as many as 500 Afghan allies for a major battle weeks beforehand, and there were hints that Afghans from both sides were talking to one another. This is not surprising given the nation's culture.[48]

Several U.S. soldiers heaped derision on Zia, painting a picture of a well-prepared opposition that made ample use of advanced weaponry. One soldier told the press that Zia "punked out on us. . . . I don't know how much we paid him, but I'll shoot him myself. He was supposed to roll in. Day 1, he was supposed to attack, and we were supposed to set up blocking positions so they couldn't get out."[49] Another soldier said Zia "didn't perform. He took a couple of mortar rounds and took off."[50] The soldiers had respect for the enemy: "They're a helluva lot more fancy than people give them credit for. . . . There were lots of weapons, mortar tubes. These guys were good with mortars."[51]

Noting that Afghan units had an insufficient force ratio but that they recovered from a serious mortar attack to take several key positions, one unnamed Special Forces colonel defended Zia: "The forces [Afghans] put together are different from our American military force. They're not an American military force. We can't expect them to be. It makes them no less noble, no less brave, no less willing to get out and engage our common enemy, and General Zia has, make no mistake about it. I take exception to those folks who complain about what these people have done to get us to this point in the battlefield. You wear his shoes that he has worn for five months in this battlefield."[52]

An unnamed senior USAF officer, quoted in the *Washington Times*, criticized U.S. tactics in the battle of Shah-i-Khot.[53] He asserted that commanders should have used air strikes for days or weeks, allowing precision-guided bombs and AC-130 howitzers to pummel the caves and compounds. This less-than-discreet officer also attempted to draw a parallel to the 1993 U.S. debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia. He pointed to the mid-December 2001 Tora Bora air campaign as a successful template, but he failed to mention that many al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders had slithered away during that period. Franks simply modified the Tora Bora tactics and sent in U.S.-trained Afghans to block escape routes and do the fighting, only committing relatively large numbers of U.S. ground troops when Afghan allies ran into problems. As another unnamed senior officer rightly observed, "No tactical plan ever survives the first encounter with the enemy. . . , and this plan changed 180 degrees."[54]

At a 6 March Pentagon press conference, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that "other than very brave people being involved, this has nothing to do with Mogadishu, and the individual who was killed; his body has been retrieved, and so too have the wounded. And, I don't see any comparison."[55]

When asked by ABC interviewer Sam Donaldson if the U.S. troops who were attacked and pinned down by al-Qaeda fire on 2 March were surprised by the tenacity of the resistance, Franks pointed out that intelligence is an inexact endeavor. "There will certainly be places . . . where we'll encounter very, very substantial resistance. We will almost never have perfect intelligence information. I would not downplay the possibility that forces that moved into this area got into a heck of a firefight at some point that they did not anticipate. I think that is entirely possible. . . . I think we've seen it in the past. . . . I think we'll see it in the future."[56]

Perhaps enemy commander Maulvi Saifurrahman Mansoor, who was up in the mountains, inadvertently best described the battle's outcome when he said that al-Qaeda fighters would "continue to wage jihad until our last breath against the Americans for the glory of Islam and for the defense of our country."[57] ***MR***

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The Search for Larry A. Thorne: Missing in Action, Vietnam

Jeffrey B. McDowell

To the U.S. Army, he was Captain Larry A. Thorne. In Finland, he was much-decorated war hero Lauri Torni. Vietnam was his fourth war. He had worn a uniform for three different armies, three different countries, in four different decades. In October 1965, he and three South Vietnamese crewmen disappeared in a Republic of Vietnam Air Force CH-34 helicopter somewhere in the jungle near Kham Doc.

Thorne enlisted in the U.S. Army in January 1954. However, it was not his first time in uniform—not even close. He had also served in the Finnish Army, fighting in the Winter War of 1939- 1940, and in Germany he did a training stint with the Waffen S.S. After his return to Finland, he fought in the Continuation War. He also fought with German guerrillas against the Russians during World War II, for which he was awarded the German Iron Cross Second Class. In six years, he had fought in three wars and had been awarded every award for valor that Finland had to give, including the Mannerheim Cross, Finland's equivalent of the Medal of Honor.

Thorne's stint with the Waffen S.S., complete with photos of himself in a German S.S. uniform, proved an especially tough hurdle to overcome when he later applied to join the U.S. Army. But, in 1956, after serious lobbying, he received U.S. citizenship and his commission as a first lieutenant in the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

By late 1960, Thorne had attained the rank of captain and become a member of the Army's elite Special Forces, the Green Berets. In 1962, he led his Special Forces detachment to the summit of Iran's Zagros Mountains to recover classified material that was being transported on a U.S. Army aircraft that had crashed. Although German and Iranian expeditions to the 14,000-foot crash site had failed, Thorne and his men secured the information and recovered the bodies of the aircrew.

In November 1963, Thorne and Detachment A-743 entered Vietnam for a six-month tour. In April 1964, author Robin Moore was in Tinh Bien where Thorne's detachment was stationed. Moore was gathering material for a book on Special Forces based on the detachment's exploits. The book, *The Green Berets*, became a best-selling novel and later became a movie that starred John Wayne.[1]

The film did not accurately depict the ferocious fighting that occurred at Tinh Bien and other camps. As evidence of the battle's true fierceness, consider this: every member of Detachment A-743 received a Purple Heart for wounds suffered at the camp in Tinh Bien. Thorne received two Purple Hearts and a Bronze Star for valor.

Thorne's second tour to South Vietnam was his last. In February 1965, he was assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Soon afterward, Thorne was funneled into a special operations augmentation program, then into Headquarters Company, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), Special Detachment 5 89 1. Thorne became a soldier in the

secret war in Laos.

According to H.A. Gill III's book, *Soldier Under Three Flags*, Thorne was the newest member of the top secret Studies and Observations Group (SOG), whose mission was gathering information.[2] On 18 October 1965, Thorne and three Vietnamese crewmen were returning on a CH-34 helicopter from a covert mission in Laos. The pilot had radioed Kham Duc complaining about low visibility because of heavy clouds just before the helicopter disappeared. Exhaustive searches for the crash site were undertaken with no luck. Enemy fire, poor weather, and the rugged terrain made searching even more difficult. On 19 October 1966, the U.S. Army listed Thorne as killed in action, body not recovered.

Before his final mission, Thorne had been recommended for promotion to major and was being groomed for a staff job as an intelligence officer. He was posthumously promoted to major in December 1965. His family also received his posthumous Distinguished Flying Cross Medal.

The Search for Thorne

From the time of the loss in October 1965, when search and rescue sorties had flown over the helicopter's last reported position, until 1975, there were virtually no new leads about Thorne's disappearance. Then, a letter from MACV-SOG, dated 9 November 1965, provided a previously overlooked clue that documented a change in the possible last known location of Thorne's helicopter.[3] The clue was not much, but it was enough to pass on.

During the prisoner of war/missing in action (POWMA) technical talks in Hanoi on 5-6 April 1993, Thorne's case narrative was passed to the Vietnamese in an effort to open dialogue concerning the site of the crash and his fate. This action led to an interview by a joint task force-full accounting (JTF-FA) investigative team of a witness in Phuoc Son District Town, in Quang Nam Province, who claimed to have found a helicopter crash site in 1988 while hunting in the area. He led investigators to the site where some material evidence, including a data plate bearing serial number 56-3384, was collected. Unfortunately, the witness had no information concerning remains. Subsequent wreckage analysis determined the recovered data plate belonged to a known downed aircraft.

Thorne's case was again brought to the attention of the Vietnamese during technical talks held in Hanoi on 28 September 1994. During the 46th Joint Field Activity (JFA), in May 1997, a joint team traveled to Phuoc My in Quang Nam Province to investigate a report of an uncorrelated crash site in the area. The team interviewed two Vietnamese who claimed to have observed an aircraft flying toward Kham Duc in the spring of 1968. One man said he heard an explosion but did not attempt to locate the crash site for almost three weeks. The second man claimed no firsthand knowledge of the incident, but he said that his brother told him he had recovered some remains from the site in 1995. Despite the fact that one of the Vietnamese believed the crash occurred in 1968, nearly three years after it actually did, the team had the witnesses guide them to the site. The team recovered portions of a helmet, two dog tags belonging to Vietnamese individuals, 50 bone fragments, and pieces of aircraft wreckage consistent with a CH-34.

Not until May 1998, during the 50th JFA, was the crash site linked to Thorne's loss. Because of the number of undocumented CH-34 and other aircraft losses in the Kham Duc area, it was impossible to say with any certainty which site was the one where Thorne's aircraft crashed. Only after a number of sites had been thoroughly documented did the team conclude that the site was likely that of Throne's loss. The team recovered possible human remains and recommended the site for excavation.

The site was listed as a primary site for excavation for the 56th JFA, which took place 13 July to 14 August 1999. Army Captain Mark Hollingsworth, from the Army's Central Identification Laboratory (CILHI) at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, led recovery element-6 (RE6). Hollingsworth and the rest of T Team, consisting of 12 service members, began excavating on 15 July.

Nicknamed the Highlanders, the team included an anthropologist, a communications specialist, a wreckage analyst, a medical specialist, and mortuary affairs specialists, explosive ordnance disposal personnel, and interpreters. "Everyone on our Highlander team saw the task before them as a challenge that needed to be overcome, weather, mud, critters, it didn't matter. If this was Thorne's crash site, we determined not to let it be his final grave," Hollingsworth said.[4]

On 21 July 1999, five young men from Helsinki, Finland, all members of the Lauri Torni Memorial Chapter, arrived in Hanoi. They had traveled more than 10,000 miles to help the JTF-FA/CILHI team excavate the helicopter crash site that was possibly Thorne's. The Finns included Kari Kallonen, a managing author for the Finnish publishing company United Magazines; Petri Sarjanen, a newspaper and television reporter; Juha Saxberg, a professional photographer and advertising designer; Juha Rajala, Thorne's nephew, a logistics manager; and Tapio Anttila, a videographer.

Within an hour of arriving at the base camp, the Finns began the first of many downhill treks from the base camp to the excavation site. One of the first people they met was Dennis Danielson, the anthropologist. Danielson, a former Marine and Vietnam veteran, took a few minutes from digging and overseeing the entire recovery effort to explain his role in the recovery operation. The anthropologist, or anthro, as the teams called him, maintained the site's scientific integrity. Random holes were not being dug; rather, the team was systematically removing layers from a tightly documented series of 4- by 4-meter grids marked by stakes and twine beginning at the point of impact and working toward the base of the hill.

The anthro determined the dig's direction and depth. The depth was marked by a distinct change in the

Errata:

"If you are going to make me an officer, how about Generalissimus?"

In our March-April 2002 edition, longtime Military Review *author, Jacob W. Kipp was mistakenly cited as being a retired lieutenant colonel in the byline of his earthshaking article"Tectonic Shifts and Putin's Russia in the New Security Environment."*

soil's strata. At this site, the correct depth was reached when the soil changed from an oily, clay-like material to a sterile, orange-brown soil. Two different types of soil, with no transition between the two, occurred at a depth of 4 to 6 inches. Because of the shallowness of the affected area, the team could make rapid progress down the slope. The Finns immediately noted the delicateness of the work. The tool of choice was not the shovel, but the pickaxe, which was used to scrape or dislodge the right amount of soil before striking the sterile layer directly beneath.

The recovery element hired about 60 local villagers to help with excavation. The Vietnamese formed two bucket brigades. This particular site included two side-by-side grids. One line of Vietnamese workers took soil from each grid. This method allowed Danielson to annotate in his sweat-stained notebook exactly where and in which grid items or remains were found.

The Vietnamese also helped sift soil through one-quarter-inch mesh screens. There were 10 screens per sifting station. One person oversaw two screens each. Activity was constant for 45 minutes of each hour. Eventually, 304 square meters of earth were sifted. Huge piles of finely sifted soil begin to form at the workers' feet as they searched for any clue to the identity of the helicopter's passengers.

Soon after the Finn's arrived, the site began to yield its first clues. Three human teeth were found the first day—two molars that had solid gold restorations and a tooth that had no restoration. Spare buckets began to fill with small parts from the demolished helicopter. Almost every bucket of earth revealed bullets—lots of them. Some still had intact casings, some did not. There appeared to be at least three separate types of ammunition on board: .45-caliber rounds; 7.62-millimeter rounds, and an unidentified type of rifle round, which could have been bullets for Thorne's favorite weapon, a 1903 Springfield rifle he supposedly always carried.

For four days the team sifted dirt, videotaped, and photographed the site, recovering nearly a dozen teeth, hundreds of possible bone fragments, data plates from the helicopter (definitely a CH-34), and other items. Hollingsworth said, "It didn't take long before the visiting Finns went from visitors to members of our team the Highlanders. When they weren't photographing the site, they were digging soil and sifting it right alongside us. We welcomed their help. Hearing the stories that Thorne's nephew told really put a face to the individual we were searching for."[5]

The Site

The helicopter struck near the top of a 3,000-foot mountain. The area was covered with heavy foliage including hardwood trees that towered 80 to 100 feet over the terrain. One of the trees contained a large section of the main rotor blade. The blade appeared to be folded around the tree itself. How far up the blade was carried as the tree grew during three decades is anyone's guess.

The helicopter burned on impact. After almost 34 years, there are still signs of scorched trees. The hillside has a 50- to 60-degree slope and is only accessible by foot. The closest road is one kilometer east of the site. To an observer, it was fairly obvious that most of the wreckage had washed down the hillside, gathering in piles. The 9-cylinder engine assembly lies intact, 3 meters from a huge tree. Despite the passage of time, it almost looks like it could be put back into service with a little work from a competent mechanic.

As with most sites, there has been some scavenging by the indigenous population. All of the sheet metal that once covered the downed helicopter is gone, ferried away with anything else that could be recycled, which is a common occurrence at crash sites in Vietnam. In fact, some sites are so heavily scavenged only unusable scraps remain. The Vietnamese are industrious, and more likely than not, the helicopter's engine is still at the site only because local villagers have not yet figured out a way to cart it off.

Post Script

Despite the fact that the site had not been positively identified as being Thorne's, the Finns were given a hero's welcome when they returned to Finland. They took with them pieces of wreckage and other mementos, including a European-made machine gun recovered from the site. According to Rajala, the wreckage will be placed in the Helsinki War Museum, which has dedicated a section to Thorne's memory.

Danielson officially closed the site on 2 August 1999. More than 300-square-meters of earth had been excavated and screened. The excavated area measured approximately 6- by 36-meters long with two 2- by 4-meter grids added to the base of the slope to encompass an additional area of possible deposition of burned ash.

The team recovered four personal items: two padlock keys, a small section of dog-tag chain, and a damaged Vietnamese coin. Human teeth and hundreds of small pieces of bone fragments were repatriated to the United States on 7 Monday 1999 in a ceremony at the Hanoi Noi Bai International Airport. U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Pete Peterson attended. After the remains arrived in Hawaii on 8 September 1999, they were taken to the Army's Central Identification Laboratory.

In December 1999, a third book about Thorne was published in Finland. Titled, *Ristirelki 1965-1999*, it recounts the story of the Finns' experiences while in the highlands of Vietnam.[6] The United States and Finland sincerely hope that when DNA and dental-record analyses are completed, the mystery of Thorne's fate will finally be solved. Both countries benefited greatly from Thorne's military expertise.

The difficult and often dangerous hunt for and possible recovery of the remains of all personnel missing in Southeast Asia remains a high priority; it is the least we can do. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Robin Moore, *The Green Berets* (NY: Crown Publishing Co., 1965); *The Green Berets* (Hollywood, CA: Warner Studios, 1968).
2. H.A. Gill, *Soldier Under Three Flags: Exploits of Special Forces' Captain Larry A. Thorne* (Ventura, CA: Pathfinder Publishing, 1998).
3. Ibid.
4. Mark Hollingsworth in interview with the author, 24 July 1999.
5. Ibid.
6. Karin Kallonen, *Ristirelki 1965-1999* (publishing information unavailable).

Jeffrey B. McDowell was a Public Affairs Assistant and Navy journalist in the Public Affairs Office for Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, from July 1997 to December 2000. He has also served in Bahrain and is current aboard aircraft carrier U.S.S. John F. Kennedy *stationed in the Northern Arabian Sea.*

MR Book Reviews

THE HEART OF CONFEDERATE APPALACHIA, John C. Inscoe and Gordon B. McKinney, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 368 pages, $39.95.

In *The Heart of Confederate Appalachia,* John C. Inscoe and Gordon B. McKinney explore the history of western North Carolina before, during, and after the Civil War. The picture that emerges is of a much more complex society than the one popular images portray. Having been home to fewer slaves and slave-holders and, thus, less supportive of the Confederacy, western North Carolina was less inclined to support secession before the firing on Fort Sumter.

Once President Abraham Lincoln called for troops to force seceded states back into union, western North Carolina secessionists' sentiment became stronger than that of the rest of state, backing their sentiment with action. As the war dragged on and casualty lists mounted, they lost their enthusiasm, not so much because they were pro-Union, but because they were anti-Confederate. In this, Carolina highlanders' opinions differed little from their eastern Tennessee Unionist neighbors' viewpoints.

This book suffers from covering too much ground, but arguments are well presented and supported. The 41 plus pages of endnotes are a mine of information.

MAJ D. Jonathan White, ***USA, Smithfield, Virginia***

INFANTRY SOLDIER: Holding the Line at the Battle of the Bulge, George W. Neill, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2000, 356 pages, $24.95.

Infantry Soldier: Holding the Line at the Battle of the Bulge, is George W. Neill's personal account of his life from the moment of his induction into the U.S. Army during World War II until he left the front lines during the Battle of the Bulge. Neill's military career began in the Army's Enlisted Reserve Corps at the University of California, Berkeley. The program allowed young men pursuing higher education to remain in college while attending ROTC. However, with the buildup for the cross-channel attack in 1943, most of these young men were called to active duty.

Neill paints a fair description of the realities of college boys coming face to face with the regular Army cadre and all the barriers, whether actual or perceived, they had to overcome. He takes us from the training cycle, to being shipped overseas, to training in England, to deploying to Europe. Neill illustrates an exact picture of the hurry-up-and-wait attitude and what the reality of the situation is to any private soldier when it comes to being told what is happening in relation to the big picture.

Neill records some aspects of leadership, especially at company grade and below, and his opinion about the seeming lack of concern from higher level leaders and from other soldiers whose job it was to support the fighting infantrymen comes across loud and clear. He expounds relentlessly with clarity and skill about the needs of frontline soldiers and units for proper clothing, food, shelter, and everyday basics.

Only someone who has been there can best characterize the frontline infantryman's plight. Neill is an excellent advocate for the common foot soldier. He urges leaders to recognize and find solutions to the hardship and privation soldiers must endure.

LTC Billy J. Hadfield, ***USA, Beavercreek, Ohio***

MOUNTAIN SCOUTING: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers on the Frontiers, Edward S. Farrow, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2000, 284 pages, $12.95.

That the U.S. Army had no Indian-fighting doctrine during its first century is curious. Edward S. Farrow's book, *Mountain Scouting: A Handbook for Officers and Soldiers on the Frontiers,* was written to fill the gap. First printed in 1881, the handbook was used during the last decade of the Indian wars. Thereafter, campers and outfitters used it.

The book is of interest today as an example of company-level frontier military procedures. Subjects covered include care of horses and mules, musketry, first aid, tactical marches, camps, tracking, rations, skirmishing, and the Indian character. However, this modern edition fails to note the information that is no longer valid. The book repeats the old saw advising whiskey for snakebite, and the advice about using gunpowder to season meat should warrant a caution note; modern gunpowder might be poisonous.

The chapter on the Indian character provides observations gleaned from Farrow's years in command of Indian Scouts. However, he seems to believe that he has learned all there is to know, assaying a cockiness not uncommon to the era.

A topic that crops up often throughout the book, which makes the book seem disorganized, is the use and care of horses. Horses were the transportation of the time. A modern equivalent would concern helicopters and motor maintenance.

Farrow stresses marksmanship training. The Frontier Army gave little attention to this subject and even less training and ammunition, much to its detriment. The poor performance of Union marksmanship during the Civil War inspired the formation of the National Rifle Association, but the problem persisted.

This book provides a window to what an experienced company-level officer thought important to the Frontier Army. We might learn something from the fact that the same general topics are still of concern over 100 years later.

Kevin L. Jamison, ***Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri***

THE PHILIPPINE WAR, 1899-1902, Brian McAllister Linn, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000, 434 pages, $39.95.

The Philippine War, 1899-1902, by Brian McAllister Linn, is the first operational history of the Philippine War. Linn covers the war in both its conventional and guerrilla stages and, along with a handful of other specialists, exploits the extensive U.S. archival collections about the Philippines and the war. He chose the book's neutral title to avoid stirring up emotions unnecessarily.

In the book's first part, "The Conventional War, 1899," Linn narrates the sequence of events leading up to U.S. engagement with a Filipino army and the subsequent conduct of conventional operations. He focuses on the nature of the indecision that gripped the U.S. Government about creating an overseas empire, the actions of decisionmakers in Manila, and the ad hoc nature of the commitment. This is coupled with a description of the conventional battles fought, the planning by the U.S. staff, and the logistic problems encountered. Linn narrates the stages of the U.S. buildup, the nature of Filipino opposition and the factions within it, and the composition of the U.S. Army. He makes astute judgments about Filipino and U.S. commanders, the problems they faced, and the measures they took to overcome them. He explains that the balance of forces did not necessarily favor the U.S. Army and that the Filipinos began with advantages they squandered.

In the second part, "The Archipelago, 1900-1902," Linn details U.S. Army counterinsurgency campaigns waged after Filipino conventional forces had been defeated. He shows how the U.S. Army waged a successful war based on policies that combined coercion and reward, repression and civic action, and the ways these worked in different jurisdictions.

Although Linn's concern is the U.S. effort, his judgments of the main Filipino and U.S. historical actors are judicious. He points out that the U.S. Army was composed of three different types of forces: regulars, state volunteers, and U.S. volunteers. All proved adept at fighting a counterguerrilla war. Linn also tells of the Filipino guerrilla organization, its leadership, and the ways it divided itself ethnically and socially at different times on different islands.

In arguments among specialists, questions have been raised over whether the United States won the war or whether the Filipinos lost it. This dispute need only detain specialists; it is sufficient to remark that the U.S. Army was aided by the Filipinos' mistakes.

The Philippine War was the first war during which U.S. soldiers had to cope with tactical, logistic, medical, and communications problems inherent in waging war in the tropics. And, as the most successful conventional and counterguerrilla campaign U.S. forces ever waged, it established the United States in the Philippines until the country was granted independence in 1946.

Once stripped of the ideological baggage that has far too long hindered understanding of it, the Philippine war emerges as a case study of localized guerrilla war and indigenous resistance to foreign rule. Scrutinizing it in all of its complexity offers insight into the conduct of military interventions, civic action, peacekeeping, and stability and support operations. I strongly recommend this book.

Lewis Bernstein, ***Senior Historian, USMSC, Huntsville, Alabama***

A CHAIN OF EVENTS: The Government Cover-up of the Black Hawk Incident and the Friendly Fire Death of Lt. Laura Piper, Joan L. Piper, Brassey's, Dulles, VA, 2000, 320 pages, $23.95.

FRIENDLY FIRE: The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Blackhawks over Northern Iraq, Scott A. Snook, Princeton University Press, NJ, 2000, 257 pages, $35.00.

On 14 April 1994, the pilots of a pair of U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagle fighters descended below their mandated altitude restriction of 10,000 feet, misidentified two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters on a routine mission in the Iraqi northern no-fly zone, and fired on both aircraft without permission. In 10 minutes, 26 people died. In the aftermath of the shootdown, U.S. President William Clinton made a promise to "find the answers to the questions the families so rightfully seek." Unfortunately, the answers to so complex a problem are not so easily determined. Two authors, with widely differing backgrounds and perspectives, set forth to find those answers.

Joan L. Piper, the mother of one of the victims, a grade school teacher from San Antonio, Texas, is married to a career U.S. Air Force (USAF) officer. Her credentials extend far beyond the horizons of a grieving mother. The experiences of 26 years of military service foster a depth of knowledge and understanding with which few can compare. In *A Chain of Events*, she demonstrates a clarity and tenacity of purpose that often belies her tragic loss.

Piper's book is much more than a tale of a mother's grief for her slain child; it is a poignant portrait of a daughter lost and a mother's grim quest for the truth. The book is a gripping story of a woman's search for closure after a tragic loss and a chronicle of a family's battle through the seemingly impenetrable walls of a stalwart bureaucracy. More than anything else, however, the book is an account of the strength and honor of a military family in crisis. Piper's conclusions are emotionally charged, yet nonetheless valid: her story is of a mother's search for an accountability that consistently avoids her grasp.

Lieutenant Colonel Scott A. Snook, a career U.S. Army officer with more than 20 years of military service, is a victim of friendly fire himself, having suffered at the hands of a USAF A-7 fighter during the invasion of Grenada in 1983. A professor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Snook holds a doctorate in organizational behavior and serves as the director of West Point's Center for Leadership and Organizations Research.

Friendly Fire is a deeply intriguing analysis of a highly complex incident that resulted in needless deaths. In contrast to Piper's humanistic approach, Snook presents a compelling tale of a system gone awry. Drawing on an extensive knowledge of systems theory and

organizational behavior, he weaves an account of an organization on the edge of chaos, a nearly deterministic system ultimately responsible for the resultant loss of life. His conclusions are as disturbing as they are fascinating: an exceptionally reliable system manned by knowledgeable, rational human beings still failed to prevent the incident the organization is designed to forestall. Snook paints a disconcerting picture of the potential pitfalls of organizational complacency that every military professional should take to heart.

Both books are concise, well-written accounts of human tragedies. Piper relates a tale of family, love, and loss. Snook presents a thoroughly analytical, yet exceptionally unambiguous, narrative of the events that ultimately led to the deaths of 26 peacekeepers. Any research into this incident would be incomplete without the information these two authors provide. Military professionals should consider both books as essential reading.

MAJ Steven Leonard, ***USA, Fort Campbell, Kentucky***

AN EMPIRE DIVIDED: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean, Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2000, 392 pages, $55.00.

In *An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean*, Andrew O'Shaughnessy contends that other British colonies, in particular the British West Indies, provided the linchpin of British strategy during the American Revolution. Although the "sugar" islands had many citizens who supported the call for independence by mainland colonies, there was little open support for the American Revolution because of reasons of external and internal security. The islanders were more concerned about the potential threat of foreign invasion and occupation or slave revolts.

Drawing on primary and secondary source material, including private correspondence, colonial council and assembly minutes, and the contemporary press, O'Shaughnessy makes clear that the American Revolution was much more than Saratoga, Valley Forge, and Yorktown. *An Empire Divided* convincingly outlines why the British saw Caribbean colonies, not mainland colonies, as the possible primary theater of operations.

Even though "the Caribbean colonies shared to a large degree the essential preconditions of the American Revolution," they did not join in the mainland's rebellion. The island colonies had greater social and financial ties with England than did the mainland colonies and feared slave insurrection. O'Shaughnessy notes, "[I]n 1770, the year of the Boston Massacre, when the army became the chief symbol of tyranny in North America, the British West Indian assemblies" called for more troops to guard against slave rebellions and to increase the size of their garrisons to help deter foreign attacks. "Slavery thus reinforced metropolitan ties and made whites a besieged minority dependent on Britain for their ascendancy." A combination of economics, threat of slave rebellion, and fear of invasion or attack by competing colonial powers kept the sometimes sympathetic British West Indian islands from joining their cousins to the north in their war against English tyranny and taxation.

Although it has been 226 years since the rebellious 13 colonies declared their independence, the debate over why they were successful, or why England was unsuccessful, rages on. To this intellectual inferno, O'Shaughnessy brings a well-organized, thought-provoking, masterly narrative history of the Caribbean side of the story.

Andrew G. Wilson, ***The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.***

THE 21 INDISPENSABLE QUALITIES OF A LEADER: Becoming the Person Others Will Want to Follow, John C. Maxwell, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, TN, 2000, 156 pages, $14.99.

This short book is one military professionals would do well to read, but only if the reader is willing to conduct the honest introspection essential to the personal application of the qualities listed. Otherwise, the book will be a waste of time because the qualities are presented in only an abbreviated, cursory manner; there is no depth to the definitions of the qualities and only minimum discussion of their application.

The book begins with a discussion of the characteristics of character. Regrettably, definition is sorely lacking. John C. Maxwell uses the words integrity and truth once each, but otherwise he assumes everyone knows what character means. The term has different definitions, and only an accepted definition based on foundational principles can convey Maxwell's meaning.

Maxwell asserts that commitment, charisma, and communication are essential to good leadership, but he fails to acknowledge that these qualities also have inherently negative components. German dictator Adolf Hitler was charismatic and committed, but his actions caused the deaths of millions. Leaders can communicate by extolling and motivating positively those under them, or they can communicate by demanding results through intimidation and fear. Such qualities can only be considered in terms of the leader's character.

Maxwell lists several qualities that every military leader must address. Two of those are initiative and courage. Readers who recall the zero-defects army remember it as being the antipathy of leadership. The mentality that asserts that there will be no mistakes stifles initiative and courage and promotes fear of innovation or seeking the difficult job. The courage to take a risk can bring great reward or great failure. Unless risk-taking is fostered by a leader who encourages innovation and problem solving and is willing to take the responsibility for a subordinate's failure (other qualities Maxwell lists), the organization will stagnate.

This book's value is directly proportional to the reader's honesty. Either it will confirm one's inflated sense of leadership ability, or it will cause the sincere reader to examine his or her leadership qualities. The reader must then be secure, courageous, and reflective enough to develop those areas where he or she finds shortcomings. This book is worth only what the reader is willing to put into it.

Richard L. Kiper, ***Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas***

THE FRANCO REGIME 1936-1975, Stanley G. Payne, Phoenix Press, London. Distributed by Sterling Publishing, NY, 2000, 676 pages, $24.95.

Francisco Franco's Falange Party dictatorship in Spain, which arose almost contemporaneously with those of German Nazi Adolf Hitler and Italian Fascist Benito Mussolini, outlasted those leaders by 30 years. In *The Franco Regime,* Stanley G. Payne provides provocative reasons for Franco's longevity.

To place the regime in proper focus, Payne gives an overview of kaleidoscopic Spanish politics beginning with Spain's defeat by U.S. forces during the Spanish-American War in 1898. Payne pays particular attention to Primo de Rivera's dictatorship and the Second Republic.

Franco's rise to power as a fighting general set the stage for the beginning of his dictatorship in 1936. Payne reviews Franco's World War II diplomacy, from the German phase, when soldiers from the Spanish Blue Division fought alongside Nazi troops in Russia, through nonbelligerence, to neutrality. Franco's key concern was the perceived best interest of Spain, much to the frustration of Hitler and other would-be allies.

After World War II, isolated from the West because of fascist tendencies during the conflict, Spain turned inward, emphasizing Catholic religion and seeking ties with Latin America. However, the global conflict against communism soon found Spain back in the community of western nations, demonstrated first by the revocation of a U.N. boycott, then by admission to the United Nations, and finally by a state visit by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959. The 1960s were marked by yet another shift, as an aging Franco increasingly was surrounded by a bureaucratic elite who forged the 1969 agreement with exiled Spanish heir to the throne Juan Carlos to restore the monarchy after Franco's death.

In an excellent chapter placing events in perspective, Payne notes that despite labeling, the Franco regime was authoritarian, not totalitarian: it did not seek to control all aspects of Spanish life. While noting that despite Franco's personal dictatorship, which allowed limited representation to flower, Payne concludes that it is incorrect to relate Spain's democratic present to its Franco past.

LTC James J. Dunphy, *USAR, Fairfax, Virginia*

HISTORY MAKERS: Interviews, Fred Schultz, ed., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, 256 pages, $27.95.

The U.S. Naval Institute publishes *Naval History,* which features interviews with interesting people tied in one way or another to the U.S. Navy or the sea. David McCullough writes about it; Jean-Michel Cousteau lives for it; Ken Burns films it. Many of the interviewees are U.S. Navy or U.S. Marine Corps careerists or veterans. *History Makers,* edited by Fred Schultz, is a collection of some of the better interviews from 1995 through 2000. Interviewees include historians, underwater explorers and exploiters, newsmen, actors and filmmakers, military and political leaders, and a couple of astronauts. Included are Ernest Borgnine, William Crowe, Dick Cheney, Art Buchwald, Tom Brokaw, and Shelby Foote, Jr., among others.

In one of the stronger interviews, pilot and astronaut William F. Readdy talks about his time in the A-6, the Russian space program, his shuttle experiences, and the general development of the U.S. Shuttle Program from a military to a scientific or technical one. He gives his views on the Program's future; mankind's future in space, including the prospects for a manned trip to Mars and Russian-American cooperation; and career prospects in space for today's youth. He also draws an interesting analogy between landing the shuttle and landing on an aircraft carrier.

Sometimes, the interviews end just as they are getting interesting. For some of the lightweights, such as Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and Ken Burns, the interviews are more than long enough. For Borgnine's war stories and Brokaw's book-marketing words, the length is sufficient.

For a meaningful dialogue with Crowe or Casper Weinberger, the interviews are not long enough. There is always the question unanswered. For example, when Cheney says there has not been a debate or a new rationale for a strong defense since the end of the Cold War, he opens an opportunity to be asked his rationale. Instead the interviewer shifts gears, asking, "[W]hat, if anything, could you have done to keep the A-12 program from being cancelled?" Cheney answers by saying it was not that good of a program because the contractor could not deliver, and the F/A-18 was a better if workaround choice.

Questions are not always worth the space they occupy, especially given the consistent attempt to get at least one anecdote into what might otherwise prove a serious piece. Mostly this collection is an evening's worth of easily digested reading before an undisturbed night's sleep.

Fans of the short interview will enjoy this collection, which serves as an appetizer, a tease, a taste of what a real conversation might be like with a wide variety of navy-related people. Readers who value a well-developed, full-blown essay—something full of the insights and opinions of significant contemporary military leaders—must look elsewhere.

John H. Barnhill, *Ph.D., Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma*

THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WARS, Dale C. Copeland, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2000, 311 pages, $45.00.

Dale C. Copeland, a professor of political science at the University of Virginia, defines major wars as high intensity conflicts in which national existence as a great power, if not a sovereign country, is at stake. His is a simple thesis that is not simple minded: from antiquity through World War II, major wars have been a preventive policy by which a government seeks to preserve its military status against a potential rival on the ascent.

The classic case, to which Copeland devotes two chapters, is that of Imperial Germany on the eve of World War I. Although Germany clearly had the best army in the world, it could not match Russia in the realm of potential economic power—land, raw materials, and size of population. If it did not reduce

Russia's capabilities while it still had the capacity, Germany's future would have been dim indeed. Worst of all, in 1914, Germany's future was near-term. Russia's army and economy was modernizing, thanks to French capital investment.

Not willing to select only specific examples that obviously support his general thesis, Copeland takes on the Napoleonic Wars and World War II (Europe), supposedly begun by megalomaniacs wanting to dominate the globe, not simply to protect the temporary status of their nation-states. If Copeland can prove that the actions of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte and German dictator Adolf Hitler were essentially defensive and that their wars were preventive, not imperialistic, he could prove his case.

Copeland gives it a good effort, reproducing quotations that proved these leaders' fears of domination, whether by England's commercial power in the 1800s or the Soviet Union's industrial capacity circa the 1930s. One wonders how much this really mattered; it only proves that fear as well as ambition motivated Napoleon and Hitler.

What was truly important was that the only way Napoleon and Hitler could feel safe was to dominate the world. This is preventive, in a sense, but it is also meglomaniacal, but that brings up issues of ideology and personality, which Copeland expressly eliminates. To him, they are irrational factors irrelevant to a theory em-phasizing power ratios and dynamics, particularly how declining nations, motivated by rational self-interest, view rivals moving up the hierarchy of international competition.

Copeland's concluding chapter is far more humble than the bulk of his book. He admits that any particular war has numerous causes, including that of ambition to which he hitherto gave short shrift. I understand that theory puts a premium on simplicity and economy. However, Albert Einstein was a genius because his postulate was both simple and correct: he did not sacrifice one attribute for the other. Yet, Copeland's book is useful. I will never try to analyze the causation of another war without asking which nation, in the midst of a long-term decline, has a rational incentive to start armed conflict now. Is that the whole answer? Of course not, but neither is anything else. Copeland, a first-class mind, recognizes this fact, but he might have paid it a bit more heed.

Michael Pearlman, *Ph.D.*,
Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

AMERICA'S ASIAN ALLIANCES, Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb, eds., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000, 143 pages, $17.95.

Amid the uncertain and diffuse geopolitical climate, Robert D. Blackwill and Paul Dibb's *America's Asian Alliances* comes at an opportune time to stimulate politicians and academicians to review the ambiguous U.S. foreign policy toward Asia.

The book's first two chapters review the region's geopolitical background and sketch the extent of U.S. involvement in Asia since 1900. Blackwill and Dibbs concisely summarize the short-term strategic outlook for this highly diverse region by subregions, then identify potential flashpoints and how these have evolved.

The book examines U.S. alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. While analysts detail the conditions that spawned each alliance, they express surprise at how little each alliance has evolved to meet new challenges in the regions. Analysts believe that in order to remain relevant there is a need to reexamine the costs and benefits of maintaining alliances amid the changing geopolitical climate. Where costs clearly outweigh benefits, such as with Japan, there is a need to renegotiate the alliance. The essayists recognize that the United States' unilateral approach toward many regional issues, without consulting its alliance partners, tends to undermine the alliance's essence. Alliance partners should be proactive and coordinated to shape U.S. assessments and actions in the region, especially toward China and regional crises.

Blackwill feels that the relevance of the three bilateral alliances and enhanced cooperation between the four nations remains critical and that it is necessary to reinvigorate and improve their effectiveness. Policy prescriptions should be directed at strengthening, coordinating, harmonizing, and synchronizing alliances, policies, and actions in dealing with the many issues the Asia region presents, particularly toward regional crises, China's rising prominence, and the developments on the Korean peninsula. There is no one sure-win policy that can be applied across the board. The key to retaining the relevance of alliances is coordination.

The book's value lies in its ability to give readers an appreciation of the difficulties that face the United States and its alliances when dealing with the highly diverse issues in Asia. I strongly recommend this book to all military professionals, especially Asian foreign area officers and regional military personnel who would like to have an unbiased yet comprehensive overview of the region's dynamics, complexities, and diversities as they relate to the formulation of comprehensive and consistent strategic policies for the region.

MAJ Kelvin Koh, *SC*,
Singapore Armed Forces

FROM SURPRISE TO RECKONING: *The Kargil Review Committee Report,* Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2000, 277 pages, $39.95.

India-Pakistan—perhaps nowhere else on earth does the risk of nuclear war run so high. Yet, in 1999, this did not deter Pakistan from infiltrating an estimated 1,500 to 2,400 regular and irregular forces into the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Army and Air Force suffered over 1,500 casualties before compelling the Pakistanis to quit the fight. In the aftermath of this conflict, the Indian Government established a committee to review the sequence of events leading up to the incursion and to recommend measures to safeguard against similar armed intrusions in the future. The interested strategist, however, discerns a larger issue here: what possible strategy was Pakistan pursuing that would cause such a bold move? *From Surprise to Reckoning* addresses this question from an Indian perspective and raises the

unsettling prospect that nuclear weapons can serve as a rationale for, rather than a deterrent against, armed conflict.

From Surprise to Reckoning maintains that Pakistan's motivation for its move into Kargil was to project Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint in hopes of internationalizing the conflict. Given the heightened state of international sensitivities following the successful 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the timing for such a plan could not have been better. The Pakistani objective was to convince the international community to intervene—the earlier, the better. Under this scenario, Pakistan would have retained at least some of its gains and thereby been able to bargain from a position of strength. The most frightening aspect of this strategy was that Pakistan felt emboldened to attempt it because it believed its own nuclear capability would restrain the Indian response. Needless to say, a dangerous precedent would have been set had events played out in Pakistan's favor.

The report provides an unexpectedly candid assessment of the total failure of India's intelligence services to detect any indications of the Pakistani infiltration. The Indians were caught completely off-guard because they lacked adequate intelligence capabilities, specifically, high-resolution imagery satellites and high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles. Of greater significance, however, is that the Indians had developed a mindset about the nature and extent of the Pakistani threat in the Kargil sector. All the observed Pakistani activity was viewed within this context: the Indians simply did not believe military intrusion was sustainable in this sector. This probably had as much to do with their overall intelligence failure as did their lack of state-of-the-art sensors.

I highly recommend *From Surprise to Reckoning* to military strategists. Admittedly, it gives only one side of the story; the Pakistani version would undoubtedly read much differently. Nevertheless, the report provides an excellent overview of all aspects relevant to this brief conflict. The discussion of Pakistan's overall strategy for playing the nuclear card in Kashmir is thought-provoking, albeit a bit repetitive.

Any strategist interested in studying a real-world example of an information operations (IO) campaign would be well advised to read this report. There is no doubt the Pakistanis developed and implemented an extremely sophisticated and integrated IO plan for Kashmir. Based on the recommendations the committee outlines, it appears the Indians are now moving in a similar direction.

MAJ Randall J. Welp, *USA,*
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THE FUTURE OF TERRORISM,
Maxwell Taylor and John Horgan, eds., Frank Cass Publishers. Distributed by International Specialized Book Services, Inc., Portland, OR, 2000, 234 pages, $24.50.

The Future of Terrorism contains essays submitted at the conference for Future Developments in Terrorism, in Cork, Ireland, in March 1999. The central thesis that resonates in the editor's introduction and individual essays is that terrorism has evolved beyond the traditional view of state-sponsored organizations that commit acts of violence as an expression of nationalism. Terrorist organizations are now more complex, and their motivations stem from a more diverse range of ideologies. Two supporting views that the essayists submit that have significant value to military and civilian strategists expound on terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the emergence of terrorists as transnational actors.

As with many nations and various legitimate organizations, the end of the Cold War caused most terrorist organizations to change their modus operandi to guarantee survival. The authors and editors of *The Future of Terrorism* support this argument by discussing the decline of state-sponsored terrorism, facilitated against the back-drop of the post-Cold War; increases in intrastate terrorist organizations; the blurring of distinctions between terrorism and organized crime; and the emergence of organizations with motives based on extremism and religion. In fact, lawmakers can link terrorist organizations to crimes such as extortion and bank robbery. The commitment of terrorism for monetary gain represents a significant shift from terrorism connected to ideologies.

The shift away from strong ideological motivations also affects potential WMD use. For a terrorist organization to use WMD, its belief in ideology must surpass its sense of survival. Using a WMD could enrage

world opinion and lead to the organization's destruction. This runs contrary to the beliefs of many security analysts, who cite the 1995 use of a nerve agent in a Tokyo subway as a sign of future use.

The emergence of terrorists as transnational actors is a recent phenomenon. Transnationalism is a term used to describe organizations that operate internationally but do so without state sponsorship or direction. The end of the Cold War opened the way for some terrorist organizations to expand their area of operations. This expansion, because of logistics and financial support, made coordination between the various organizations a necessity. Osama bin Laden is a good example of a transnational terrorist. He has links to several states in the Middle East and Africa as well as ties to other terrorist organizations. The ability to move in and out of different circles, similar to guests at a garden party, makes prediction of terrorist strikes extremely difficult.

This thought-provoking book provides valuable insight into the complexity of terrorist organizations and their evolution. I highly recommend it.

MAJ Steven M. North, *USA,*
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NATIVE VS. SETTLER: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa, Thomas G. Mitchell, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 243 pages, $69.95.

In his first book, *Native vs. Settler: Ethnic Conflict in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa,* Thomas G. Mitchell compares and defines the basic roots and characteristics of three classic conflicts and insurgency movements—those of Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Mitchell, an independent researcher who studied in Israel and Ireland and traveled extensively in South Africa, compiles 12 years of research into a comparison work in which he seeks to identify key elements common in each case study. His key thesis is that settler conflict—pitting a settling population as part of a colonization effort against a native population—begins and evolves in a loosely definable pattern.

The military strategist will find utility in Mitchell's work for two reasons. First, Mitchell outlines concise histories and the politics and ideologies driving the conflicts in Ireland, Israel, and South Africa. Second, without taking sides, he describes the evolution of these conflicts, comparing characteristics of each. These common characteristics, on cautious reflection, might be applied universally as the strategist attempts to understand the dynamics fueling conflicts in areas where U.S. or UN forces must conduct peace enforcement or peacekeeping missions. At the least, Mitchell raises questions each of us can ask while developing and examining courses of action for such missions.

In each case study, Mitchell compares and contrasts such subjects as democracy, or the degree of liberal democracy; cultural institutions; political and cultural mythology; motives; settler assimilation and native liberation movements; and counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaigns. He takes critical aim at each side's often less than stellar terroristic or oppressive tactics and human rights records and follows to ground the effect of these tactics in prolonging settler conflicts.

Identifying popular political myths and their role in solidifying popular support on both sides of the issue, Mitchell frames the manner in which settler conflicts continue to fuel themselves. Realizing that external factors and internal splinter group extremism affect such conflicts significantly, Mitchell examines these forces, their goals, and the repercussions of their actions.

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DEADLY SKY: The American Combat Airman in World War II, John C. McManus, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 435 pages, $32.95.

Deadly Sky: The American Combat Airman in World War II, by John C. McManus, is the account of combat aircrews of all services as told in their own words. Occasionally, collections of reminisces are suspect because of what can happen to memory during the time between events and the retelling. However, McManus injects enough historical research to build a context for the veterans' anecdotes.

McManus is to be commended for the organization of his material. He follows a logical sequence beginning with the backgrounds of the principle contributors and of U.S. airmen in general. From there he follows them through training, first assignments, vagaries of the different theaters, flying missions, and ends with the men's reflections on the war and their comrades.

In the last chapter McManus analyzes why and what the airmen fought for. Almost to a man they said it was for the other members of the crew or squadron. In other words, they did not want to be found wanting in the eyes of their peers. In an interesting parallel, when ground combat soldiers are asked the same question the answer is invariably the same. I suspect this says more about the universality of warriors than anything in particular about U.S. airmen.

The only fault with McManus' work would be the overabundance of bomber crew stories and in particular those of the Eighth Air Force, which was stationed in England. Granted, the air campaign against Germany was the focal point of the U.S. air war during World War II, but a few more anecdotes from the other services or theaters would have given the book more depth.

LTC M.R. Pierce, *USA,*
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CUSTER: Cavalier in Buckskin, Robert M. Utley, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2001, 256 pages, $29.95.

Historian Robert M. Utley has published several works about the life and times of George Armstrong Custer. In those books, Utley did much to reveal the almost mythical figure and define him as person, husband, and soldier. The begging question 12 years later is simply, what has changed? To be short, enough to justify a revised edition.

In this 2001 edition of *Custer: Cavalier in Buckskin,* Utley reopens the issue of Custer and attempts to refine his thoughts as they bear on the intriguing events of June 1876.

What marks this edition from previous work is the assimilation of information, scholarship, and the significant developments in archeology since 1989.

The Little Bighorn Battlefield has always been of considerable interest to historians because it is physically unique: the sites where Custer's men died are generally marked where soldiers fell. Even 100 years later this recording of battlefield dead demands from all who observe it interpretation and analysis.

A grass fire on the battlefield in the 1980s and subsequent rains exposed new artifacts, which prompted an ambitious and compelling subsurface archeological survey. The results of that survey have challenged many of the commonly held beliefs, some Utley's, of what occurred there. Utley is quick to recognize and credit those involved in the work that has shaped his refined opinions. This book lays a strong foundation for further research on the subject.

MAJ Ted J. Behncke, *USA,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

DIARY OF A DIRTY LITTLE WAR: The Spanish-American War of 1898, Harvey Rosenfeld, Praeger Publishing, Westport, CT, 2000, 207 pages, $57.95.

Harvey Rosenfeld seems to presume that writing history means piecing together instances in time. Perhaps because he has never realized that good history is much more, this book fails to get off the ground. The liner notes promise "experiences of the Jewish and black communities in the war" and "extensive reports of land battles." Unfortunately, these are absent. Rosenfeld analyzes the Spanish-American War as a conflict where disease runs rampant and living conditions are atrocious.

Because the book is written chronologically in a day-by-day diary format, it is fast-paced; however, this leads to confusion. Various threads have no continuity, and there is no analysis, partially because the book is written as though the events were happening in the present. There are also several misspellings and misprints.

Another problem is historical error. One example is the identification of James Longstreet as a brigadier general. The highest rank Longstreet held was major. In the Confederate Army, Longstreet attained a corps commander position and held the rank of lieutenant general. This might seem insignificant, but it is imperative when writing a factual account that all facts be true.

Overall, Rosenfeld promises much but fails to deliver. Other one-volume works are much more comprehensive, and they come more highly recommended.

SPEC David J. Schepp, *USA,*
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HOT SHOTS: An Oral History of the Air Force Combat Pilots of the Korean War, Jennie Ethel Chancey and William R. Forstchen, eds., HarperCollins Publishers, NY, 2000, 240 pages, $25.00.

Hot Shots will thrill aviation lovers. I knew this book was good by page 2 because that is where combat begins. But I really fell in love with the book on page 15 when a Korean War pilot told his story of landing at an unpaved field to live, work, and fly P-51s with minimal support and only tents for buildings. From that beginning, the stories cover a range of subjects from combat scenes to a detailed account of a pilot prisoner of war held in China after the war was over. The tales are from the prop age to the jet age.

While the book gives details about the aircraft, the pilots are the heroes, and the editors allow the aces to tell their stories in their own words. The editors also know that readers want action, and they provide it.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, *USAF,*
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FLAGS OF OUR FATHERS, James Bradley with Ron Powers, Bantam Books, NY, 2000, 384 pages, $24.95.

I did not know that one of the people in the famous flag-raising photo from Iwo Jima was a Navy Corpsman. I did not know that one of the people in that famous photo was a Native American. I did not know that only three of the people in the photo survived the fight: they died even though President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a confidential order to have the six men who raised the flag transferred back to the United States. In fact, the point of *Flags of our Fathers* is that the figures in the photo were real soldiers. If the photo is awesome, so was the price that was paid for it.

During the battle for Iwo Jima, Lieutenant Colonel Chandler Johnson saw, after four days of fighting, that it was possible to get a platoon to the top of the mountain that dominated the island. First Lieutenant H. George Schrier from Easy Company led a patrol up Mount Suribachi. Johnson handed a small U.S. flag to Schrier and told him to put it up if he got to the top.

As Schrier's patrol was raising the flag, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal was coming ashore. On seeing the flag waving atop the mountain, Forrestal commented that the flag raising guaranteed a U.S. Marine Corps for at least 500 years. He decided he wanted the flag as a souvenir. When Johnson heard of Forrestal's request for the flag, he was furious; the flag belonged to the battalion. Johnson sent Lieutenant Ted Tuttle to the beach to secure a larger flag to replace the one that had been raised.

As Tuttle searched for a flag, a detail was formed to run a communications wire to the top of the mountain. Five men were selected. Just before they departed they were handed a flag and told to put it up and retrieve the original one for Johnson. The men reached the top of the mountain around noon.

Photojournalist Joe Rosenthal snapped the photo on 23 February 1945. He heard that a flag had been raised on Suribachi on Iwo Jima. Although he had been told that he would not be able to get a photo of the actual flag raising, he wanted to go anyway. Rosenthal and two other photographers reached the top just after the detail. Out of the corner of his eye, Rosenthal saw movement. He turned, raised his camera, and snapped the picture that is probably the most famous combat photo ever taken.

I purposely left the names of the six men out of this review. I cannot do them justice in such a short note. While reading this book, I realized

the intensity of the human element of combat. Stephen Ambrose feels it is the best battle book he has ever read. I have not read as much as Ambrose, nor have I ever even attempted to write a book about battle, so I am left to merely agree with his comment. This is the best battle book I have ever read.

MAJ John W. Amberg II, *USA,*
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THE INVENTION OF PEACE: Reflections on War and the International Order, Michael Howard, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2001, 113 pages, $15.00.

Michael Howard has undertaken to explain why war has been a "universal norm in human history" and to assess the prospects for creating a peaceful world order. He discusses wars from medieval times to the present, including such related issues as class structure, religion, political economy, just war, and collective security. Proceeding through history, Howard finds war to be caused alternately by class struggle, Hegelian desire to prove the fitness of the state, patriotic zeal, and ideological difference. Ultimately, he concludes that universal peace requires cultural homogeneity, including a common language, political cohesion, a "freely accepted framework of law," universal education, and "a highly qualified elite, capable not only of operating their complex legal, commercial, and administrative systems, but of exercising considerable moral authority over the rest of society."

This ambitious work by a great military historian attempts to cover too much ground for a 113-page monograph and, thus, provides little insight: it is a distillation of material well known to those who study the subject. The book is totally devoid of theory. Immanuel Kant's idea that peace can be established through a league of republican states is used as a loose theme for the study, but Howard makes no reference to any of the vast literature on this subject. Indeed, there are no footnotes or references of any kind. While the book is unsatisfying, it is enjoyable to read and is a useful primer for beginners, although less so than perhaps a dozen other works.

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